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New Therapies, Old Problems, or, A 
Plea for Neuromodesty 
Stephen J. Morse, University of Pennsylvania 
This article suggests that investigational deep brain stimulation (DBS) for mental disorders raises few new bioethical issues. Although the scientific basis of the procedure 
may be both complex and largely unknown, addressing informed consent in such situations is a familiar problem. After reviewing the legal and moral background for 
investigating DBS and the scientific difficulties DBS faces as a potential treatinent for mental disorders, the article focuses on informed consent and makes two primary 
suggestions. The study of DBS may proceed, but "hyper-disclosure" of the complexities should be required for competent subjects or proper surrogates if the candidate 
is not competent, and the most rigorous standard for competence sho,tld be employed. Throughout, neuromodesty and caution are urged. 
Keywords: bioethics, de;zp brain stimulation, informed consent, neuroethics, psychiatric disorders, psychosurgery 
DBS for psychiatric disorders may be a new therapy, but the 
issues it raises, including autonomy concerns, are familiar 
in bioethics because the same issues have been raised pre­
viously for other medical and psychological therapies (see 
generally Morse 2004; 2009). The basic framework of benefit, 
harm, and autonomy is no different whether one is consid­
ering proven or experimental psychological, pharmacolog­
ical, or physical interventions such as DBS. All interven­
tions change the brain. The issue is how. Context matters, 
of course, and the hard work will be applying the general 
ethical parameters to the specific problems DBS will create. 
The ethical problems psychiatric DBS does and will pro­
duce stem from our lack of knowledge about the relation 
between the brain and complex human behavior, from lack 
of data about the effects of DBS, and from mostly innocent 
overclaiming about our knowledge that may undermine 
attempts to proceed cautiously (Morse 2005). Nonetheless, 
there is enormous agreement in both individual and expert 
group writings on both sides of the Atlantic about the eth­
ical concerns and the types of restrictions that should be 
placed on DBS. 
This article addresses the important background le­
gal/ethical and scientific considerations. Then it turns to 
the problem of autonomy itself. Questions of harms and 
benefits are not discussed unless they bear directly on the 
autonomy problem. The basic conclusion is that DBS should 
continue under extremely strict constraints with competent 
patients who have been exquisitely fully informed and per­
haps also with incompetent patients if there is proper sub­
stituted judgment consent. 
ETHICAl AND LEGAl BACKGROUND 
The related legal and ethical questions are political and 
metaethical: For example, how parentalistic versus liber-
tarian do we wish our regime to be and what meta-ethical 
commitments do we wish to make, if any? All commenta­
tors appear to concede that the usual framework of benefit, 
harm, and autonomy for thinking about the acceptability of 
any intervention, whether it is proven or experimental, is 
the appropriate framework. I expand those three categories 
to seven-efficacy, intrusiveness, side effects, potential for 
abuse to the subject and others, cost, distributional concerns, 
and autonomy-but the analysis is similar. 
The problem is that none of these variables is self­
defining with a consensual meaning . These terms are of 
varying vagueness and are capable of diverse broad and 
narrow interpretations. For example, writers have distin­
guished "moral autonomy," the capacity to subject oneself 
to objective moral principles, and "personal autonomy," a 
value-neutral ability of individuals to self-govern any as­
pect of their existence they deem important according to 
whatever goals or desires they choose or have. We might 
also characterize the distinction as between objective or 
virtue autonomy and subjective autonomy. Are there ob­
jective moral principles, however, and how would we dis­
cover them? Moreover, which form of autonomy one might 
privilege will depend on the strength of one's preference for 
individual liberty. Should the conception of autonomy we 
adopt be a legal right, a normative ideal, or a set of basic fac­
tual capacities? The answer theoretically is all three, but as 
a practical matter it is a legal right and we must decide the 
contours of that right in the context of experimental DBS. 
Let me provide an analogy from U.S. constitutional law. 
The Supreme Court is often asked to decide what process 
is due when the government seeks to infringe on a partic­
ular liberty and there is no specific provision in the Consti­
tution to decide the question. For example, should some­
one about to lose welfare benefits for violating the terms of 
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receiving those benefits be entitled to a formal hearing and, 
if so, what further protections should be provided at the 
hearing? The Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test 
for deciding such cases that balances (1) the importance of 
the interest at stake; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation 
of the interest because of the procedures used, and the prob­
able value of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the 
government's interest (Mathews v. Eldridge 1976). Although 
these are the right considerations, this balancing test has 
never been outcome determinative and is always elastic de­
pending on the court's political and moral preferences. 
The same will be true in any bioethical context. Deciding 
whether and when a proven or experimental intervention 
is permissible suffers from the same use of contested ethical 
and political concepts and from indeterminacy. We some­
times forget this when weighing considerations pro and 
con. Focusing on the correct considerations is only the be­
ginning of the moral enterprise, however. Being sensitive to 
context and practice will be crucial. 
Scientific Considerations 
As Kuhn and colleagues (2009) wrote: 
DBS for psychiatric patients is not a standard therapeutic 
method. Therefore, every application of DBS in a psychiatric 
patient somehow enters into the experimental domain and has 
to be justified by a thorough, in-depth an<� lysis of benefits, risks 
and burdens. (5137) 
Just so. In this context I think we should be especially 
cautious for the most basic scientific reasons. Autonomy, 
however it is understood, is preserved by the doctrine of 
informed consent. The question is what we can justifiably 
tell patients as they, or surrogate decision makers, decide 
whether the subject should undergo DBS. I begin with gen­
eral considerations and then turn to the specifics. 
The brain-mind-action connection is one of the hardest 
problems in science. Many think, for example, that explain­
ing consciousness, which is a crucial aspect of our subjective 
experience and moral lives, may be the hardest problem 
in science, and some claim that it is beyond current hu­
man capacities to solve it (McGinn 1999). I am agnostic, but 
these are indisputably difficult problems. Although there 
has been substantial progress in understanding the neural 
correlates and some causes of certain types of cognition, at 
present we have no idea how the brain enables mental states 
and how action is possible (McHugh and Slavney 1998). For 
example, we would like to know the causal difference be­
tween a neuromuscular spasm and intentionally moving 
one's arm in exactly the same way, but we do not know the 
difference. 
Many people hope that intertheoretic reduction of psy­
chological states to brain states will help to solve the prob­
lem, but the intertheoretic reduction program has failed to 
explain mental states and social life. We cannot even ac­
complish the allegedly simplest reduction from chemistry 
to physics, and there is theoretical reason to believe that 
the reductionist program cannot succeed. In my opinion, 
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the most sophisticated current philosophy of science view 
about explaining complex human behavior-by which I 
mean mental states (including moods) and actions-is that 
a multifield, multilevel approach will be necessary (Craver, 
2007). The astonishing advances in neuroscience, especially 
those fueled by the advent of functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRJ), have scarcely changed our currently mod­
est understanding of the brain-mind-action connection. Fu­
ture advances may do so, but that is a cautiously optimistic 
speculation about the future. 
At present, most cognitive and social neuroscience stud­
ies on human beings, especially neuroimaging, involve very 
small numbers of subjects. Further, most studies average the 
neurodata over the subjects and the average finding may 
not accurately describe the brain structure or function of 
any actual subject in the study. Replications are few, which 
is especially important for law and policy. Policy should not 
be influenced by findings that are insuffiently established, 
and replications of findings are crucial to our confidence in 
a result. 
The functional neuroscience of cognition and interper­
sonal behavior is largely in its infancy, and what is known 
is quite coarse-grained and correlational rather than fine­
grained and causal (Miller 2010). Any language that sug­
gests otherwise, such as claiming that some brain region is 
the neural substrate for the behavior, is simply not justifiable 
in most cases. There are also technical and research design 
difficulties that undermine valid inferences, but future ad­
vances may remedy this. Structural findings avoid some 
of the difficulties of functional imaging, but the meaning 
of findings is often not apparent and many of the positive 
findings may be the result of significance bias (loannidis 
2011). We seldom know whether an anatomical difference 
is a cause, an effect, or just a correlate of the condition under 
investigation. 
Now let me turn to some specifics regarding psychiatric 
disorders in particular. To study such disorders. properly 
presupposes that the researchers have already identified 
and validated the diagnostic behavior under neuroscientific 
investigation. On occasion, the neuroscience might suggest 
that the behavior is not well characterized or is neurally 
indistinguishable from other, seemingly different, behavior. 
In general, however, the existence of psychiatrically rele­
vant behavior will already be apparent. And if the behavior 
and the imaging data are inconsistent, we should virtually 
always believe the behavior. Actions speak louder than im­
ages. 
If the behavioral data are not clear, then the potential 
contribution of neuroscience is large. Unfortunately, it is in 
just such cases that the neuroscience at present is not likely 
to be of much help. I term this the ''clear cut" problem 
(Morse 2011). Neuroscientific studies start with clear cases 
of well-characterized behavior, so the neural markers might 
be quite sensitive to the already clearly identified behaviors 
precisely because the behavior is clear. Less clear behavior is 
simply not studied, or the overlap in findings for less clear 
behavior is greater between experimental and control sub­
jects. For example, investigators have discovered various 
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small but statistically significant differences in neural struc­
ture and function between people who are clearly suffering 
from schizophrenia and those who are not. Nonetheless, in 
a behaviorally unclear case, the overlap between data on 
the brains of people with and without the disorder is so 
great that no imaging finding is yet sufficiently sensitive to 
be used for psychiatric diagnosis (Frances 2009). 
To the extent that neural correlates for mental disorders 
have been identified, they tend to be nonspecific. That is, 
findings in similar regions of the brain have been identified 
with mental disorders as diverse as major affective disor­
ders and schizophrenia. In the context of psychiatric DBS, 
a U.S. consensus conference concluded that "no single tar­
get has been validated or demonstrated to be superior to 
others in any disorder of MBT" [mood, behavior, thought] 
(Rabins et a!. 2009, 932). Further, it is virtually impossible to 
do the type of randomized, controlled, blinded studies that 
are typically the gold standard. Finally, the types of patients 
who will agree to investigational psychiatric DBS will vir­
tually certainly not be a random sample, even of intractable 
patients. 
Some people think that animal translational models will 
offer solutions to some of the neuroscientific problems that 
hinder achieving the goals of psychiatric therapies, but we 
should not reach this conclusion too hastily. When we are 
dealing with essentially mechanistic phenomena, such as 
the movement signs of movement disorders, animal models 
may be of great help because we are dealing with pure mech­
anisms. Unless the reductionist program succeeds, however, 
we cannot treat mental disorders, even the most severe, 
seemingly culturally impenetrable, disorders, as pure mech­
anisms. They are part of psychological experience, which 
includes mental states and actions, and are aspects of whole 
people who are makers of and interpreters of meaning, who 
reflect on their own lives, and who are always shaped by in­
terpersonal and social variables. Other animals do not have 
these capacities or do not have them to the same degree. l 
would argue that these differences often prevent adequate 
translation, even when the outward behavior of another 
animal--€.g., a grieving chimp-seems so familiar to us. 
Over time, however, these problems may ease as imag­
ing and other techniques become less expensive and more 
accurate, as research designs become more sophisticated, 
and as the sophistication of the science increases generally. 
There is also an open question of whether accurate infer­
ences or predictions about individuals are possible using 
group data for a group that includes the individual. This 
is a very controversial topic, but even if it is difficult or 
impossible now, it may become easier in the future. 
In short, at present we must admit that we do not under­
stand the neural causes of major mental disorders or how 
DBS works when it seems to do so. Talk of "neuromodu­
lation" as an explanation of its efficacy means nothing or 
very little because it is a conclusory, vague description, not 
a genuine explanation. The upshot of these considerations 
is that interventions based on justified hypotheses about 
which target to choose or about virtually any other aspect 
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of DBS are more problematic than one would suspect from 
reading the seemingly cautious literature. 
We do not need scientific understanding of why some 
intervention relieves human suffering. If we discover empir­
ically that something works, then we may be well justified 
in offering it, assuming that we reasonably understand the 
potential short and long-term harms. We do not have the 
database yet for the efficacy and harms of psychiatric DBS, 
but it is possible that we may in the future. 
INFORMED CONSENT FOR PSYCHIATRIC DBS 
The foregoing discussion suggests that obtaining informed 
consent to psychiatric DBS is exceptionally problematic. 
Even the most careful investigator is eager to learn more 
about the brain-mind-action connection, and all investiga­
tors would like to alleviate suffering. Thus, for even the most 
cautious investigator, it will be difficult not to overstate how 
much we know and how justifiably we can hypothesize. 
Informed consent, the guarantor of autonomy, raises es­
sentially two issues: who can provide it, and what must be 
provided to the patient or subject? To grant an investiga­
tor permission to violate the subject's otherwise inviolable 
right to be left alone, in U.S. law the waiver must be know­
ing and intelligent, and it must be voluntary (Berg et a!. 
2001). Whether a waiver is competent depends on a num­
ber of factors, including the subject's intelligence and ratio­
nal capacities generally; the difficulty of the decision to be 
made, and the test for competence that will be applied. In 
the United States, three general legal tests have been iden­
tified for an adequate informed consent: factual feedback, 
appreciation, and rational manipulation. Factual feedback 
is satisfied if the subject can accurately repeat what he or she 
has been told. Appreciation refers to the subject's ability to 
understand how the intervention applies in his or her case. 
Rational manipulation asks whether the subject can engage 
in a reasonable benefit-cost calculus about the intervention. 
Holding capacity and task difficulty constant, the outcome 
might be different depending on the test. 
The issue of capacity is both factual and normative. 
W hat is the subject capable of doing and what should be 
required for exercising informed consent? A currently un­
resolvable difficulty, however, is determining what a sub­
ject is capable of doing. For example, we cannot distinguish 
people who can govern themselves properly from people 
who simply are not motivated to do so. At most, generally, 
we make inferences from the subject's general behavior and 
from how well the subject seems to react to the decision at 
hand. We know from experimental work that people with 
depression, a prime psychiatric indicator for DBS, appear to 
be able to "pass" operationalized measures of the three ma­
jor U.S. tests for competence to consent to treatment (Berg 
et a!. 1996; Grisso and Appelbaum 1995). In the case of ex­
perimental DBS, the knowledge base is so thin that there 
is a strong argument that decision makers should choose 
the most demanding test, but note that choosing the most 
demanding increases the level of paternalism. 
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The prime danger for potential DBS candidates may be 
potentially poor exercise of the capacity the subject may 
have. If DBS should be reserved for intractable conditions 
that have failed to respond to all other, less invasive thera­
pies, then the subject may be "overly" motivated to engage 
in DBS. A related concern is that DBS candidates may be es­
pecially vulnerable to the "therapeutic misconception," the 
incorrect understanding that this experimental procedure 
will in fact ameliorate the subject's suffering. Investigators 
must be especially vigilant about these concerns. 
DBS raises the possibility of personality change. The im­
plications of personal transformation over time is a familiar 
problem (Parfit 1984), but, once again, context matters. As 
experience with DBS for Parkinson's disease has indicated, 
profound behavioral changes can accompany sudden, me­
chanically produced improvement in previously debilitat­
ing conditions (Haarh et a!., 20 10; Mayberg and Lozano, 
2002). Despite the dramatic improvement, patients often 
are less than pleased, however, because such changes make 
reintegration in sociofamilial and professional life difficult 
(Agid et a!. 2006). But even this context is somewhat familiar. 
People often voluntarily expose themselves to experiences 
that can transform them and their lives suddenly and me­
chanically, such as having open heart surgery and surgery 
for epilepsy. Whether and how often radical personality 
shifts of sO-called "narrative personality" or identity will 
occur are open questions, and if they do, DBS may not be 
directly accountable. 
Assuming such reintegrative or identity problems will 
occur with psychiatric DBS, as long as the subject is in­
formed about the possibility and the transformed subject 
retains rational capacities, the potential for transformation 
should not be a bar to consent. Moreover, in the future we 
may be able to identify which patients are likely to experi­
ence such disruptions from psychiatric DBS and we may be 
able to mitigate the problems through targeted counseling 
(Schectman, 2010). 
The possibility that the intervention will disable the per­
son and undermine future autonomy does not seem high, 
but it is a potential outcome of many neurosurgical proce­
dures and it is best handled by utterly full disclosure. For 
example, DBS for Parkinson's disease causes some patients 
to lose their energy and ambition. Full disclosure of such 
risks for psychiatric DBS is once again hampered by our 
limited database, but this, too, can be fully disclosed, and 
experience with Parkinson's disease does not suggest that 
frequent, massive disabilities should be expected. 
My preferred solution for competent subjects is "hyper­
disclosure." I have a strong normative preference for permit­
ting people to make unencumbered decision about how to 
govern their own lives and generally set the competence bar 
rather low. But subjects must be absolutely fully informed 
in this context in which we know so little. The complexity 
of the intervention, the expectations of the subject and sig­
nificant others, the particulars of the operation, and all the 
other issues must be completely discussed and any potential 
subject on the margin of consent should be discouraged. 
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What if the potential subject is not competent to provide 
informed consent according to the governing competence 
standards, thus raising a genuine autonomy problem? One 
possibility is to bar DBS absolutely, but this may prevent 
obtaining knowledge in circumstances in which we might 
most need it and it may condemn the subject to needless suf­
fering. Despite our lack of understanding of the mechanism 
of change, DBS does seem to alleviate psychiatric suffering 
in a nontrivial number of cases, which is why experimenta­
tion continues. 
Assuming that incompetence is not an absolute bar, who 
should decide, and should we use a subjective or objective 
standard for substituted judgment? Again, these are famil­
iar problems. Family members are usually best placed to 
make such decisions, but there can be an inevitable conflict 
of interest. If we are reasonably certain that the substitute de­
cision maker is genuinely attempting to act in the subject's 
best interest, should the decision maker try to determine 
what the subject would have wanted to do or use a more 
objective, reasonable person standard? In this instance, it is 
hard to know what outcome either standard would produce 
because the procedure is so experimental. Advance medical 
directives are unlikely to clearly cover such situations. I have 
a general preference for subjective standards because I pre­
fer maximizing self-governance, but I have no strong view 
in this context. The difficulty of exercising substituted judg­
ment by any standard suggests that incompetence should 
perhaps be an absolute bar, but I do not want to reach this 
conclusion yet. The possibility of substituted judgment in 
this context requires the most careful attention. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, my proposal is for neuromodesty and all that this 
entails. The ethical questions are familiar and little differ­
ent from those raised by any experimental procedure about 
which the knowledge and hypothesis base is so slim. As 
more data accumulate, however, the ethical issues specific 
to DBS will emerge more clearly. 
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